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One important approach to the foundations for subjective probability is the strategy to reduce rational degrees of belief to
normative decision theory. Savage’s [17] is a classic among such theories. De Finetti’s Book argument, dating from about
1930 and summarized in [3], is another. De Finetti considers personal previsions, which are an agent’s fair prices for buying
and selling random variables. These random variables are deﬁned with respect to some common space of possibilities. De
Finetti introduces a criterion of coherent previsions: that the agent’s fair prices cannot be used to form a set of trades that
result in a uniform sure loss with respect to that space of possibilities. Thus in de Finetti’s theory, coherence is a normative
decision theoretic constraint on an agent’s previsions: avoid sure loss. He established the central result that a set of previ-
sions is coherent in this sense just in case there is some (ﬁnitely additive) probability against which the prevision for a ran-
dom variable is its expected value. When the random variables are indicator functions for events, coherent previsions are the
agent’s personal probabilities for those events, and the agent’s fair prices are her/his coherent betting odds. De Finetti thus
reduced the problem of rational degrees of belief to the problem of coherent previsions.
Starting in about 1960, de Finetti emphasized two coherence criteria – coherence1 for previsions (as described above), and
coherence2 for forecasts assessed by Brier score. He established [3,5] that these two criteria are equivalent for purposes of
distinguishing between sets of previsions or sets of forecasts that are undominated versus those that are dominated. Coher-
ence is the common requirement that a decision maker avoids dominated alternatives. A set of previsions are coherent1 i.e.,
they are undominated by the alternative of the status quo – there is no ‘‘Book’’ – if and only if those same quantities, when
used as forecasts evaluated by Brier score, are coherent2, i.e., they are undominated by any rival set of forecasts. In his later
presentations de Finetti favored coherence2 over coherence1 because, in addition to providing an equivalent criterion for
coherence, also proper scores provide a method for incentive compatible elicitation, unlike the situation with coherence1
and the prevision game, as we call it. In Section 2, we make precise and explain these claims.
De Finetti’s theory of coherent previsions, coherence1, serves as the basis for numerous IP generalizations – see
[13,26–28] for examples. However, we know of no parallel development of IP theory based on proper scoring rules. It isy Elsevier Inc.
feld), mark@cmu.edu (M.J. Schervish), kadane@stat.cmu.edu (J.B. Kadane).
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proach to an IP version of coherence2 and illustrate how that approach works. In Section 4 we present an impossibility result
for a real-valued proper IP scoring rule. By contrast, we illustrate a strictly proper, lexicographic (non-standard) IP version of
Brier score. In Section 5 we conclude with remarks about the approach begun here.2. De Finetti’s two criteria for coherence
2.1. Coherence1 and coherence2
We begin our review of de Finetti’s theory with a reformulation of his ﬁrst coherence criterion, coherence1, which con-
strains a rational agent’s fair prices for buying and selling random variables. Coherence1 requires that the rational agent’s
fair prices cannot allow a set of trades that result in a (uniform) sure loss. Coherent1 previsions cannot be dominated by
the status quo, where there are no trades. We reformulate coherence1 in the context of a 2-person, 0-sum game, the prevision
game, in order to prepare the reader for concerns about strategic aspects of applying coherence1. These strategic aspects can
distort the rational agent’s play, even though that play is coherent1. That is, the rational agent may have incentives to play
coherently1 in the game while misidentifying his/her degrees of belief.
The existence of such strategic aspects in the prevision game help to motivate de Finetti’s second coherence criterion,
coherence2. Coherence2 constrains the rational agent’s forecasts for the same set of random variables by requiring that, as
assessed by Brier score, forecasts are undominated relative to each rival set of forecasts. As we explain, below, coherence2
is an incentive compatible criterion for forecasting variables that provides an alternative foundation for subjective probabil-
ity. It mitigates the strategic aspects of rational play that threaten to distort the agent’s announced prices in the prevision
game.
The prevision game, is formulated for a class of bounded variables, v = {Xi: i 2 I} each of which is measurable with respect
to a space fX;Bg, where I serves an index set. One player, the bookie, posts a fair, or 2-sided prevision P (Xi) for each Xi 2 v.
The bookie’s opponent, the gambler, may choose ﬁnitely many non-zero real numbers {ai} where, when the state x 2X ob-
tains, the bookie’s payoff is Riai(Xi(x)  P(Xi)), and the gambler’s payoff is the negative of this quantity, -Riai(Xi(x)  P(Xi)).
That is, the bookie is obliged either to buy (if a > 0), or to sell (if a < 0) jaj-many units of X at the price, P(X). Hence, the pre-
visions are described as being 2-sided or fair buy/sell prices.
The bookie’s previsions are incoherent1 if the gambler has a strategy that insures a uniformly negative payoff for the book-
ie, i.e., if there exist a ﬁnite set {ai} and e > 0 such that, for each x 2X, Riai(Xi(x)  P(Xi)) <  e.
Otherwise, the bookie’s previsions are coherent1.
De Finetti’s fundamental theorem of previsions:
The bookie’s previsions {P(X): X 2 v} are coherent1 if and only if there is a ﬁnitely additive probability P whose expected
value for X, EP[X], is the bookie’s prevision. That is:
 Coherence1 obtains if and only if EP[X] = P(X).
This result extends to include coherence1 for conditional expectations given non-null events, using the device of called-off
previsions. Let F be an event with F(x) its indicator function. The bookie’s called-off prevision, PF[X], for X given event F
has payoff in state x to the bookie: F(x)a(X(x)  PF(X)), which equals 0 – the transaction is called-off – in case event F
fails. Assuming that the conditioning event is not null, i.e., P(F)– 0, then
 Coherence1 for called-off previsions requires that EP[XjF] = PF[X].
When the conditioning event F is null, coherence1 places no substantive constraints on the called-off prevision PF[X]. That
is EP[F(x)a(X(x)  PF(X))] = 0 regardless the real-value of PF[X]. This defect in de Finetti’s formulation has been discussed
many times in the literature, and with a variety of different proposals to remedy the situation. For different corrections to
this defect in coherence1 see [7,13,16,28]. In our opinion, the debate over conditional probability given a null event is not
yet resolved. The correctives to de Finetti’s theory engender other controversies. For example, each of these four proposals
underwrites Dubins’ [6] theory of full conditional probabilities. But Dubins’ theory of conditional probability produces an
asymmetric relevance relation. (See [2].) Because such controversies about conditioning on null events do not arise for
the basic questions about IP-coherence addressed in this essay, we use de Finetti’s original version of coherence1 and side-
step the important challenge of developing a satisfactory theory of conditional probability given a null event.
The problemswe do address here are prompted by de Finetti’s [3,4] observation that strategic aspects of bettingmay affect elic-
itation of a bookie’s fair previsions using the prevision game. For example, when the bookie (believes he/she) knows the gambler’s
betting odds, then announcing a prevision is subject to strategic play in the game andmay fail to reveal the bookie’s fair prevision.
Example 1. Suppose the bookie’s fair (2-sided) prevision for an event G is .50. But suppose the bookie is conﬁdent the
gambler’s fair prevision for G is .75. So the bookie announces P(G) = .70, anticipating that the gambler will ﬁnd it proﬁtable to
buy units of G at the inﬂated price. Elicitation using the prevision game fails to identify the bookie’s fair price for G.
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utilities [20], which we mention in Section 5.
To mitigate strategic aspects of the prevision game, de Finetti turned to a different coherence criterion: probabilistic fore-
casting of random variables subject to Brier score. In this essay, where our central goal is to discuss extensions of coherence2
to Imprecise Probabilities for events, we focus on forecasting events, represented by their indicator functions. E(x) = 1 ifx 2
E and E(x) = 0 if x R E.
The bookie’s previsions serve as probabilistic forecasts subject to Brier score: squared-error loss. The penalty for the fore-
cast P(E) when x 2X is given by two functions {g1,g0} depending upon the state:
g1(P(E),x) = (1  P(E))2 if event x 2 E obtains;
g0(P(E),x) = (0  P(E))2 if event x 2 Ec obtains, which is summarized by the squared-error penalty scoreðEðxÞ  PðEÞÞ2:
For the conditional (called-off) forecast PF(E), on condition that event F obtains, the score isFðxÞðEðxÞ  PðEÞÞ2:
And just as in the prevision game, the score for a ﬁnite set of forecasts is the sum of the separate scores.
The coherence2 criterion applies to forecasting real-valued random variables, not just indicator functions.
Deﬁnition. A forecast set {P(X): X 2 v} is coherent2 if, for each ﬁnite subset of v, there is no rival forecast set {P0(X): X 2 v}
whose scores uniformly dominates in X.
The two senses of coherence are equivalent, as de Finetti established [3], Sections 3.3–3.4].
Proposition 1. A set of previsions are coherent1 in the prevision-game if and only if those same set previsions are a coherent2 set of
forecasts under Brier score.Proof. Here is a geometric version of de Finetti’s projection-argument that establishes coherence1 and coherence2 are equiv-
alent coherence criteria. We sketch his argument applied to previsions/forecasts for a complementary pair events. We use
the same geometric presentation in Section 3 in order to extend coherence2 to an IP setting.
Let v = {X1,X2} be a pair of variables where X1 is the indicator for an event A and X2 is the indicator for the complementary
event Ac. In Fig. 1, below, a pair of forecasts, {Q(A),Q(Ac)} with 0 6 Q(A),Q(Ac) 6 1, is depicted by the point (Q(A),Q(Ac)) in the
unit square. The Brier score for a pair of such forecasts depends upon the two possible values of the indicators {X1,X2}, which
are represented by the two points: (1,0), if the event A obtains, and (0,1) if the event Ac obtains. The Brier score for the pair of
forecasts {Q(A),Q(Ac)} equals the square of the Euclidean distance between the point (Q(A),Q(Ac)) and the respective point,
either (1,0) or (0,1), depending upon which of the two possible values of the indicators {X1,X2} obtains.
A forecast pair {Q(A),Q(Ac)} is incoherent2 if there is some rival forecast pair {Q0(A),Q0(Ac)} whose Brier score is smaller
regardless the realized values of the variables {X1,X2}. Thus, the rival forecast pair dominates if and only if the distance
between the two points (Q0(A),Q0(Ac)) and (1,0) is less than the distance between the two points (Q(A),Q(Ac)) and (1,0), and






de Finetti  projection
(1,0)
Fig. 1. De Finetti’s projection for Brier score.
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dominated in Brier score by any other coherent1 forecast, since moving along this line segment increases the distance, and
hence increases the squared error relative to one endpoint or the other.Example 2. Consider, the incoherent1 previsions: P(A) = .6 and P(Ac) = .7. A Book is achieved against these previsions with the
gambler’s strategy a1 = a2 = 1. Then the net payoff to the bookie is 0.3 regardless which statex obtains. In order to see that
these are also incoherent2 forecasts, review Fig. 1.
If the forecast previsions {Q(A),Q(Ac)} are not coherent1, they lie outside the probability simplex. Project these incoherent1
forecasts into the simplex. As in example2, the point (.60, .70) projects onto the coherent1 previsions at the point (.45, .55). By
elementary properties of Euclidean projection, the resulting pair of coherent1 forecasts, represented by the point (.45,55), are
closer to each endpoint of the simplex than is the pair of incoherent forecasts, represented by the point (.60, .70). Thus, the
projected forecasts have a dominating Brier score with respect to the binary partition of possible values for the variables
{X1,X2}. This establishes that the initial forecasts are incoherent2. Since no coherent1 forecast set can be so dominated, we have
coherence1 of the previsions if and only we have coherence2 of the corresponding forecasts, as required by Proposition 1. h
Notes: If either forecast is outside the unit interval, then it is outside the range for the variable being forecasted. Then it is
trivial to dominate that single forecast with a rival forecast chosen to be closer to the nearest endpoint of the range of the
variable in question. Also, just as coherence1 fails to regulate called-off previsions given a null event, coherence2 does not
regulate called-off forecasts given a null event. See [7] for a parallel revision to coherence2 in order to accommodate condi-
tional forecasts given a null event.
2.2. Incentive compatible scoring
Brier score is just one of an inﬁnite class of (strictly) proper scoring rules.
Deﬁnition. A scoring rule is (strictly) proper just in case a forecaster (uniquely) minimizes expected score by announcing
her/his previsions.
Thus, forecasting with a (strictly) proper scoring rule avoids the problem of strategic behavior present in the prevision
game: there is no opponent. Even allowing different proper scoring rules for different forecasts, by taking the combined score
for a ﬁnite set of forecasts as the sum of the individual scores, the result is again (strictly) proper. Savage [18] and Schervish
[19] characterize the (g0,g1) pairs for proper scoring rules. In [21] we establish that all (proper) scoring rules produce the
same distinction between coherent1 and incoherent1 forecasts as with Brier score, both for unconditional forecasts and for
conditional forecasts given a non-null event.Proposition 2. [21]:
(2.1) When the scoring rule is proper, ﬁnite, and continuous, each incoherent1 forecast set is dominated by some coherent1 fore-
cast set.
(2.2) When the scoring rule is proper, ﬁnite, but not continuous, each incoherent1 forecast set is dominated, but not necessarily by
a coherent1 forecast set.
Notes: Result 2.1 can be established by a generalization of de Finetti’s geometric argument, where the projection depends
upon the scoring rule. See [15]. Gilio and Sanﬁlippo [8] use a strengthened coherence criterion to extend this analysis to con-
tinuous scoring rules when there is conditioning on null events. The demonstration of result (2.2) in [21] uses game-
theoretic reasoning.
3. Coherence2 with a Brier IP scoring rule
One introduction to Imprecise Probabilities is provided by Smith’s [26] modiﬁcation of de Finetti’s prevision game, which
provides a criterion of IP-coherence1 for (closed, convex) IP sets. Rather than requiring a 2-sided, fair price, the bookie may ﬁx
a pair of 1-sided previsions for each X 2 v: the bookie may ﬁx separate buy and sell prices.
 The bookie announces one rate P(X) as a buying price for use when a > 0, and a possibly different selling price PðXÞ for use
when a < 0.
The result is a generalized Book argument. See [279, chapter 2] for some history and basic results.
Proposition 3.
(3.1) A bookie’s 1-sided previsions avoid sure loss if and only if there is a maximal, non-empty (closed, convex) set of ﬁnitely addi-
tive probabilities P where
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AndPðXÞ > supremumP2PEP½X:
When these inequalities are equalities, the 1-sided previsions are said to be IP-coherent1.
(3.2) By requiring lower and upper previsions for sufﬁciently many variables (from the linear span of v), the 1-sided previsions
avoid sure loss if and only if they are also IP-coherent1. See Theorem 1. ii of [23].
We offer a parallel version for deﬁning IP-coherence2 based on Brier score for 1-sided forecasts, as follows:
Use a lower forecast to assess a penalty score when the event forecasted fails;
Use an upper forecast to assess a penalty score when the event forecasted obtains.
Let {Ei: i = 1, . . . ,m} be m events deﬁned over a ﬁnite partitionX = {xj: j = 1, . . . ,n}. The forecaster gives lower and upper probability
forecasts {pi,qi} for each event Ei.3.1. Scoring forecasts with a Brier-styled IP scoring rule
Fix a state x 2X.
If x 2 Ei the score for the forecast of Ei is (1  qi)2 = g1(qi,x)
If x R Ei the score for the forecast of Ei is p2i ¼ g0ðpi;xÞ
That is, use the most favorable forecast value from the pair {pi,qi} for determining the score. Just as with the other coher-
ence criteria discussed here, the score for a set of forecasts is the sum of the individual forecast scores.
3.2. Dominance
A forecast set G (strictly) dominates another F if, for each x 2X, the score for G is (strictly) less than the score for F .
But, since the vacuous {0 = pi,qi = 1} forecast dominates each rival f0 < p0i; q0i < 1g, we require an additional restriction on
the class of competing forecasts in order to avoid triviality of the resulting theory of IP-coherence2.
Note: This is analogous to a problem that is usually ignored within traditional IP theory. With 1-sided previsions, it re-
mains IP-coherent1 to be strategic: announce a lower buying (and/or a higher selling) price than one is prepared to accept.
That is, knowing who is the Gambler in the 1-sided prevision game, the Bookiemay play strategically and mimic having a less
determinate IP-coherent1 set of previsions in order to secure strictly favorable gambles.
We propose that IP-coherence2 takes into account both a rival model class M, which identiﬁes the competing class of rival
forecasts, and an index of relative imprecision in a forecast set. By allowing the rival forecasts to be restricted to a particular
class M, we offer a more general approach than when the rival class is ﬁxed as the maximal class of all possible lower and
upper forecasts. This ﬂexibility permits, also, to link our approach to different theories of robust statistics, as illustrated in
Example 3, below.
Stated informally, a set of 1-sided forecasts F are incoherent2 when there exists a dominating set of forecasts G that are.
(i) at least as precise/determinate as F and
(ii) where G belongs to the model class M.
We illustrate this idea by ﬁlling in the details of the two concepts: the rival model class M and relative informativeness be-
tween forecast sets using the e-contamination class.
Example 3. Set M equal to the e-contamination class, deﬁned as follows. Let P be a particular probability distribution over
X = {x1, . . . ,xn}. Fix 0 6 e 6 1. Let Q be the simplex of all probability distributions onX. The e-contamination model, Pe, with
focus on the distribution P, is the set of probability distributions onX deﬁned by Pe ¼ fð1 eÞP þ eQ : Q 2 Qg. This model is
popular in studies of Bayesian Robustness. (See Huber [11,12] and Berger [1].) Also, it is the model obtained from Harsanyi
and Selten’s [9] ‘‘trembling hand’’ strategies where P is the target strategy which can be achieved with probability 1  e;
otherwise, with probability e strategy Q obtains. As a third reason for illustrating our ideas with the e-contamination model
is that the lower probability function from this model is also a Dempster–Shafer belief function, and updating the e-
contamination model either by Bayes’ rule or by Dempster’s rule yields the same results. For our purposes here, it is useful to
know that this class is characterized by specifying (IP-coherent1) lower probabilities for atomic events, and then using the
largest closed convex set of distributions satisfying those bounds. (See Seidenfeld [22].)3.3. IP-forecasts over a ﬁnite partition for Brier-styled, e-contamination coherence2
Let F ¼ ffpi; qig : i ¼ 1; . . . ;ng be forecasts for each state xi 2X = {x1, . . . ,xn}.
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Thus, S contains at most n-many distinct points. Each point in S has n-many coordinates.
Observe that the IP-Brier-style score for F evaluated at state xj is the square of the Euclidean distance between the jth
point of S and the jth corner of the probability simplex on X. Clearly, the IP-score for a forecast set can be improved merely
by moving a lower forecast closer to 0, or by moving an upper forecast closer to 1. So, consider dominating forecast sets only
when the dominating forecast has a score set that is less indeterminate than the score set for the dominated forecast. Here is a
candidate for relative indeterminacy which, when combined with our Brier-style IP-score, allows a characterization of e-con-
tamination IP-coherence2.
Deﬁnition. Forecast set F 2 is at least as indeterminate as forecast set F 1 (or F 1 is at least as determinate as F 2Þ if the convex
hull of score set S1, HðS1Þ, is isomorphic under rigid movements (where both shape and size are held ﬁxed) to a subset of the
convex hull of score set S2;HðS2Þ.
Note that this relation of relative imprecision, or relative indeterminacy, is merely a partial order. We opt for such a concept
so that relative indeterminacy may be extended to a variety of different real-valued indices of imprecision, e.g., by using
generalized volume of the score set to quantify indeterminacy.
We use these notions to deﬁne IP-coherence2 generally, and then continue with our illustration of IP-coherence2 with
respect to the e-contamination model.
Deﬁnition. Given an IP-scoring rule, a setF of IP-forecasts is IP-incoherent2 with respect to the model M provided that there is
a dominating set of rival forecasts G from the modelMwhere the set G is at least as determinate than the setF . Say thatF is
IP-coherent2 with respect to M if it is not IP-incoherent2 with respect to M. For convenience we will write these as M-
coherent2 and M-incoherent2.
Observe that IP-incoherence2 reduces to de Finetti’s incoherence2 when all forecasts in F are determinate, i.e., when
pi = qi for each forecasted event Ei(i 2 I), and when M is the class of all determinate, coherent1 forecasts. To see this, assume
that jXj = k. Then the score set S is the ordered set with k-many repetitions of the same jIj-dimensional point. Since the lower
and upper F forecasts for an event are identical, the k-many points in S do not vary with x. So a dominating rival forecast
set G ¼ fp0i; q0igmust also assign the same lower and upper values to each event Ei (that is, for each i 2 I; p0i ¼ q0ig, in order for G
to be at least as determinate as F . By Proposition 2.1, then if G dominates F the rival forecast set fp0ig establish that F is
incoherent2 and incoherent1.
Next, we provide two basic results for IP-coherence2 with respect to the e-contamination model.Proposition 4. Let 0 6 pi 6 qi 6 1, with n-many forecasts F solely for atoms of the algebra, the elements of the partition
X = {x1, . . . ,xn}.
(4.1) The score set S for F lies entirely within the probability simplex on X if and only if the lower and upper forecasts F
match an e-contamination model. And then F cannot be dominated by rival forecasts from a more determinate e-con-
tamination model.
(4.2) If all the elements of a score set S, associated with forecast set F , lie outside the probability simplex on X, there is a
dominating e-contamination forecast model F  with greater determinacy than F . F is IP-incoherent2 against rivals
from the e-contamination model.Proof. Result (4.1) is established by elementary calculations. If and only if each point of the score set S belongs to the prob-
ability simplex then, when statexj obtains, corresponding to the jth point of S;1 ¼ qj þ
P
i–jpi. This equality obtains for each
j = 1, . . . ,n. Then there exists an eP 0 such that for each i = 1, . . . ,n, qi = pi + e, which deﬁnes an e-contamination model. In the
opposite direction, if forecasts for the atoms are based on an e-contamination model, for i = 1, . . . ,n, qi = pi + e, and then
1 ¼ qj þ
P
i–jpi so that all of the score set S lies in the probability simplex.
Last, if S belongs to the probability simplex and a rival e-contamination model F 0 (with corresponding score set S0)
dominates, then H(S) is a proper subset of H(S0) because for each j = 1, . . . ,n, the jth point of S0 is closer to the jth extreme
point of the probability simplex than is the jth point of S. So, F 0 is less determinate than F . Thus F is IP-coherent2 with
respect to the e-contamination model.
Result (4.2) follows by the Brouwer ﬁxed-point Theorem. Begin with a forecast set F ¼ F 0, whose score set S0 has each of
its n-many ordered points outside the simplex of coherent1 forecasts. Recursively create rival forecast sets as follow. Apply
the (de Finetti) projection to each of these n-many ordered points of S0 taking them into the probability simplex of coherent1
forecasts. This creates a set of (at most) n-points T1 = {t1, . . . , tn} where each t 2 T1 is a probability distribution P() over X.
Form the new forecast set F1 = {{p1i,q1i}: i = 1, . . . ,n} where p1i =mint2T1{P(xi)} and q1i =maxt2T1{P(xi)}. This determines a new
score set S1. Since none of the points in S0 belongs to the probability simplex, by the same reasoning used in de Finetti’s
analysis for Proposition 1, F 1 dominates F0.
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created from a projection of score set S1 into the probability simplex, etc.
Since Euclidean projections are continuous functions and the probability simplex is compact, the recursive process with
forecast sets F 0;F 1;F 2; . . .. has a ﬁxed point F  in the class of e-contamination models. By a simple adaptation of de
Finetti’s argument for Proposition 1, the forecast set F iþ1 (weakly) dominates the forecast set F i unless F i is a ﬁxed point of
the process.
Note: It may be that F iþ1 merely weakly dominates F i for iP 1, since some but not all the points in Si may lie in the
probability simplex. However, since all the points of S0 lie outside the probability simplex, F 1 dominates F 0.
Last, the projection of a closed, convex set, e.g., the projection of HðSÞ into the probability simplex, is isomorphic to a
subset of HðSÞ. Thus, assuming that the each of the points of S0 is outside the probability simplex onX, the ﬁxed point F  of
the process F 0;F 1;F 2; . . ., which belongs to the e-contamination model class, strictly dominates F0, and is at least as
determinate as F 0. Hence, F 0 is IP-incoherent2 with respect to the e-contamination class. hExample 4. Here is an illustration of Proposition 4, IP-coherence2 with respect to the e-contamination model, using 5 dif-
ferent forecast sets. LetX = {x1,x2,x3}. Forecasts are for the three atoms only. The ﬁve forecast sets F jðj ¼ 1; . . . ;5Þ are pre-
sented in the form {{pi,qi} for xi: i = 1, 2, 3}. The respective score sets have three points with coordinates
{(q1,p2,p3), (p1,q2,p3), (p1,p2,q3)}, as described above.
Fig. 2 diagrams the convex hull of each score set and shows the shaded 2-dimensional, triangular simplex of probability
functions on X.
The simplex of probability distributions is shaded. Each score set projects onto S2, the score set for forecast set F 2,
corresponding to an e-contamination model.F 1 ¼ ff:55; :80g; f:55; :80g; f:55; :80gg
S1 ¼ fð:80; :55; :55Þ; ð:55; :80; :55Þ; ð:55; :55; :80Þg
F 2 ¼ ff:25; :50g; f:25; :50g; f:25; :50gg
S2 ¼ fð:50; :25; :25Þ; ð:25; :50; :25Þ; ð:25; :25; :50Þg
F 3 ¼ ff:20; :45g; f:20; :45g; f:20; :45gg
S3 ¼ fð:45; :20; :20Þ; ð:20; :45; :20Þ; ð:20; :20; :45Þg
F 4 ¼ ff:10; :35g; f:10; :35g; f:10; :35gg
S4 ¼ fð:35; :10; :10Þ; ð:10; :35; :10Þ; ð:10; :10; :35Þg
F 5 ¼ ff:05; :30g; f:05; :30g; f:05; :30gg
S5 ¼ fð:30; :05; :05Þ; ð:05; :30; :05Þ; ð:05; :05; :30ÞgFig. 2. (For Example 4).
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as, respectively, their lower (upper) forecasts are too great (too small). There is no determinate probability distribution
agreeing with either set’s lower and upper forecasts.
Forecast set F 2 corresponds to an e-contamination model with focus on the uniform probability P = (1/3,1/3,1/3) and
e = 1/4. The convex hull of the score set S2 lies in the probability simplex, as per Proposition (4.1). It is IP-coherent1 and
IP-coherent2 with respect to the e-contamination model class.
Forecast set F 3 is IP-coherent1 as it has lower and upper forecasts agreeing with a closed convex set of probabilities.
Those values agree with a rival ALUPmodel, but not with an e-contamination model. That is, F 3 is IP-coherent2 with respect
to an IP-model class deﬁned by specifying atomic lower and upper probabilities [ALUP], but not so with respect to the e-con-
tamination class, which is an IP-model class determined solely by atomic lower probabilities. (See Appendix A for additional
details about the ALUP model).
Forecast setF 4 has lower and upper forecasts that do notmatch those from a closed convex set of probabilities. Its intervals
are too wide. However, the uniform probability agrees with these forecasts, i.e., the probability values (1/3,1/3,1/3) fall inside
the forecast intervals fromF 4. Thus, in accordwith Proposition 3, the forecasts fromF 4 do not suffer a sure-loss in the 1-sided
prevision game; however, F 4 is IP-incoherent1 and IP-incoherent2 with respect to the e-contamination model class.
As indicated in Fig. 2, each of the other four convex hulls projects to HðS2Þ. That is, the process described in the proof of
Proposition (4.2) has F 2 as its ﬁxed point for each of the ﬁve forecast sets, and the process terminates after at most one pro-
jection. (See Appendix B for an illustration of Proposition (4.2) where the ﬁxed point is merely a limit of the process).
4. Incentive compatible IP-elicitation
Recall that de Finetti favored coherence2 over coherence1 because, in addition to serving as an equivalent criterion of
coherence, Brier score provides a strictly proper score. A decision maker who maximizes expected utility against Brier score
announces her/his previsions for random variables as their forecasts. Brier score is an incentive compatible elicitation for
determinate probabilities. It eliminates some of the strategic aspects evident in the prevision game. That is, for a decision
maker whose degrees of belief about events are represented by a single probability function P() and who maximizes ex-
pected utility, she/he has a unique strategy for announcing forecasts (and called-off forecasts) that minimize expected Brier
score. Announce the probability P(E) as the forecast of event E. If H is not-null, then announce the conditional probability
P(EjH) for the called-off forecast of event E, on condition that H obtains.
Recall that when H is null, coherence2 places no restrictions on the called-off forecasts given H. There is no difference to
the expected score contributed by any conditional forecast of E, called-off if H fails, regardless whether that forecast is or is
not coherent2. See [5] for an improved version of coherence2. However, our presentation in this section is not affected by the
open problem of how to resolve the problem of reducing conditional probability given a null event to a decision-theoretic
criterion of coherence.
What canbedone to extendBrier score to an incentive compatible IP-scoring rule? Thequestion is ill-formedwithout a deci-
sion rule that extendsmaximizing expected utility to IP decisions. That is, whether a particular IP-scoring rule is proper or not,
dependsuponwhatdecision rulesweallow the IPdecisionmaker touse. The IP communityhas not agreedon the answer to this
question. Here, we consider only decision rules that reduce to the rule of maximizing expected utility when IP sets of proba-
bilities collapse onto the special case of a singleton set, where upper and lower probabilities are identical and a single proba-
bility distribution represents uncertainty. Also, we require that decision rules respect the following weak form admissibility.
Let SðF ;xÞ be a real-valued IP-scoring rule for forecast set F in statex. Recall that scores are given in the form of a loss so
that smaller is better.
Admissibility principle: If for each x 2 X SðF ;xÞ 6 SðF 0;xÞ, then F is admissible in a pairwise choice between rival fore-
casts F and F 0. Moreover, if for each x this inequality is strict then F 0 is inadmissible whenever F is an option.
In this section we report two results concerning existence of proper scoring rules for eliciting upper and lower probabil-
ities for events, when the forecaster’s opinion is represented by a closed, convex sets of probabilities on a ﬁnite state space
and decisions conform to the admissibility principle. The ﬁrst of the two, Proposition 5, establishes that there is no real-
valued IP-counterpart to a continuous scoring rule, such as Brier score.
Proposition 5. There is no real-valued strictly proper IP continuous scoring rule.
By contrast, Proposition 6, if one considers scoring rules with non-standard values, then strictly proper IP-scoring rules
exist for each of two IP-decision rules. The IP-decision rules we investigate in connection with Proposition 6 are summarized
as follows, with additional details given in Section 4.2:
C-Maximin: The admissible options in a decision problem D are those that maximize their lower expected value.
E-admissibility: An option X 2 D is E-admissible if for some P 2 P and each Y 2 D, EP[X]P EP[Y].
E-admissibility-followed-by-C-Maximin: Apply C-Maximin to the set of E-admissible options in D.
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followed by C-Maximin security – there is a strictly proper lexicographic IP-Brier scoring rule.
Next, we establish and explain these ﬁndings.
4.1. Proof of Proposition 5
The impossibility reported in this result is made evident by considering the demands on a real-valued strictly proper IP-
scoring rule SðF 0;xÞ, for forecasting one event, E.
Let the interval [p,q], 0 6 p 6 q 6 1, represent the forecaster’s uncertainty for E. In general, the IP-scoring rule may be
writtenSð½p; q;xÞ ¼ g1ð½p; q;xÞ if x 2 E obtains;
andSð½p; q;xÞ ¼ g0ð½p; q;xÞ if x 2 Ec obtains:
When p = q, in order to be strictly proper and real-valued, the scoring rule must satisfy Theorem 4.2 of Schervish [12]. Spe-
ciﬁcally, with 0 6 x 6 1, the loss for the point forecast S([x,x],x), x satisﬁesg1ðxÞ ¼ g1ð1Þ þ
Z 1
x
ð1 qÞkðdqÞ if x 2 E obtains;
g0ðxÞ ¼ g0ð0Þ þ
Z x
0
qkðdqÞ if x 2 Ec obtains;where g1(1) and g0(0) are ﬁnite, and k(dq) is a measure on [0,1) that gives positive measure to every non-degenerate interval.
Continuity of the scoring rule results from a continuous measure k with no point masses. For example, Brier score results by
letting k have the constant density 2 on the unit interval.
When p < q, the impossibility of a strictly proper continuous IP-scoring rule is a consequence of the fact that, since k is
positive on non-degenerate sub-intervals of the unit interval [0,1] and continuous, and as there is no continuous 1–1
map between the unit square and unit interval, there will be rival interval forecasts [p,q] and [p0,q0] withg1ð½p; qÞ  g1ð½p0; q0ÞP 0
andg0ð½p; qÞ  g0ð½p0; q0ÞP 0:
Then the interval forecast [p0,q0] is admissible against the rival interval forecast [p,q]. When the interval [p,q] is the fore-
caster’s IP-uncertainty for event E, she/he will not have reason to announce that interval as her/his forecast rather than
the rival forecast [p0,q0]. Thus, the IP-scoring rule is not strictly proper. If each of the two inequalities is strict, as illustrated
in Examples 5 and 6 (below), then the IP-scoring rule is not even proper.
Example 5. We illustrate Proposition 5 using the ideas about IP-coherence2 presented in Section 3. Consider Brier score
adapted to a forecast interval [p,q] using the favorable end of the forecast interval. That is, letbð½p; q;xÞ ¼ g1ð½p; q;xÞ ¼ ð1 qÞ2 if x 2 E
andbð½p; q;xÞ ¼ g0ð½p; q;xÞ ¼ p2 if x 2 Ec:
Introduce a real-valued index of indeterminacy for a forecast set F ; IðF Þ, where I agrees with the partial order of relative
imprecision used to deﬁne IP-coherence2. For instance, let I([p,q]) = q  p. For real values x, y, let H(x,y) be a real-valued func-
tion increasing in each of its arguments, e.g., H(x,y) = x + y. Deﬁne an IP-Brier score for forecast set F by
BðF ;xÞ ¼ HðbðF ;xÞ; IðF ÞÞ. Then by Proposition 5, B is an improper-IP scoring rule. To complete the example, consider
event E and compare the two interval forecasts [.25, .75] and [.50, .50].
ThenBð½:25; :75;xÞ ¼ 1=16þ 1=2 ¼ 9=16
andBð½:50; :50;xÞ ¼ 1=4þ 0 ¼ 1=4;
all independent of x. Hence, the interval forecast [.25, .75] is inadmissible under this IP-Brier scoring rule B. That is, under
this variant of IP-Brier scoring rule, a decision maker whose IP-uncertainty about the event E is given by the closed interval of
probabilities [.25, .75] strictly prefers announcing the point-valued forecast [.50, .50] instead of her/his IP-interval, [.25, .75].
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First we review the two decision rules mentioned in the result. LetP be a closed, convex set of probabilities P on the space
fX;Bg. Let v be the class of bounded random variables, X, each measurable with respect to this space. For each X, write X for
the inﬁmum over P of the expected value of X,X ¼ inf P2PEP ½X;
which identiﬁes the lower expected value for X with respect to P. Identify a decision problem, D, with a closed subset of v.
That is, the options in a decision problem form a closed set of bounded variables.
The two IP-decision rules we investigate in Proposition 6 are deﬁned as follows:
C-Maximin: The admissible options in D are those that maximize their lower expected value.
Note: By making both P and D closed sets, this max–min operation is well deﬁned.
E-admissibility: An option X 2 D is E-admissible if for some P 2 P and each Y 2 D, EP[X]P EP[Y].
E-admissibility-followed-by-C-Maximin: apply C-Maximin to the set of E-admissible options in D.
In general, these decision rules have very different axiomatic characterizations. C-Maximin is represented by a real-
valued ordering of v using X-values to index each option. But that ordering violates the independence axiom for preferences.
E-admissibility is not represented by an ordering. In fact, it does not even reduce to pairwise comparisons. (See [24] for
related discussion.) Nonetheless, next we construct a lexicographic IP-Brier score that is strictly proper under either of
the two decision rules mentioned in Proposition 6.
Proposition 5 precludes a proper IP-scoring rule that elicits both endpoint of the interval forecast [p,q] for event E.
However, we may elicit either endpoint alone.
Deﬁne the lower-Brier scoring rule, b([x,y],x) = b(x,x) as:g1ðxÞ ¼ ð1 xÞ2 if x 2 E
g0ðxÞ ¼ 1þ x2 if x 2 Ec:and the upper-Brier scoring rule, bð½x; y;xÞ ¼ bðy;xÞ as:
g1ðyÞ ¼ ð1 yÞ2 þ 1 if x 2 E
g0ðyÞ ¼ y2 if x 2 Ec:Each of these is a strictly proper scoring rule for eliciting determinate forecasts. This follows immediately from Schervish’s
representation (above) where g1ð1Þ ¼ g0ð0Þ ¼ 0; g1ð0Þ ¼ g1ð1Þ ¼ 1, and k = 2 is the uniform (Brier) score density for both rules.
Lemma 1. Under the C-Maximin decision rule, respectively, the lower- (upper-) Brier score is strictly proper for the lower (upper)
endpoint of the IP-forecast [p,q] of event E.Proof of Lemma 1. We give the argument for the lower-Brier score. The reasoning for the upper-Brier score is similar. Let
p ¼ minP2PP½E and q ¼ maxP2PP½E, so that 8P 2 P p 6 PðEÞ 6 q, and these bounds are tight. The lower-Brier score of the fore-
cast [r,s] for E depends solely on r. The P-Expected score for forecast [r,s] is:EP½b½r; s ¼ PðEÞð1 rÞ2 þ ð1 PðEÞÞð1þ r2Þ ¼ ð1 rÞ2 þ 2rð1 PðEÞÞ:
By simple dominance, 0 6 r 6 1. For a given forecast r, this expected penalty score is greatest among P 2 P at P(E) = p, when
the expected score is (1  r)2 + 2r(1  p). But since lower-Brier score is strictly proper, this worst value is best, i.e., the worst
of these expected scores is smallest uniquely for a forecast with r = p. hLemma 2. Under the E-admissibility-followed-by-C-Maximin decision rule, respectively, the lower- (upper-) Brier score is strictly
proper for the lower (upper) endpoint of the IP-forecast [p,q] of event E.Proof of Lemma 2. Again, we give the argument only for the lower-Brier score. Since lower-Brier score is a strictly proper
scoring rule for determinate forecasts, the E-admissible forecasts are exactly those of the form [r,s] where p 6 r 6 q, and r 6 s.
That is, consider P 2 P with P(E) = r. Only forecasts of the form [r,s] maximizes the P-expected lower-Brier score. Hence, rel-
ative to lower-Brier score, the set of E-admissible forecasts with respect to the IP-set P are interval forecasts of the form
{[r,s]: p 6 r 6 q, and r 6 s}. Then, by Lemma 1, the C-Maximin solution from this set is uniquely solved at r = p. h
By Proposition 5, unfortunately, the real-valued composite score obtained by adding together these two scores,
bð½r; sÞ ¼ bð½r; sÞ þ bð½r; s, is not an IP-proper scoring rule, which we verify with Example 6.
Example 6. We illustrate the impropriety of the real-valued IP-score, bð½r; sÞ, in accord with Proposition 5.
Consider an extreme case where the forecaster is maximally uncertain of event E, so that the vacuous probability interval
[0,1] represents her/his uncertainty. The precise forecast [.5, .5] has constant b-score, i.e.,
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The straightforward forecast [0,1] has the constant scorebð½0;1;xÞ ¼ 1þ 1 ¼ 2;which also is independent of x. So forecast [.5, .5] strictly dominates forecast [0,1] under the b-scoring rule.
Instead of a real-valued IP-scoring rule, we use a 2-tier lexicographical (non-standard) composite scoring rule to combine
these two scores in a manner that creates a strictly proper (but non-standard) IP-Brier score.Deﬁnition. The two-tier, lexicographic IP-Brier score for the interval forecast [p,q] of event E, which we write as bLU([r,s]), is
the 2-tier lexicographic loss functionbLUð½r; s;xÞ ¼ hbð½r; s;xÞ; bð½r; s;xÞi:
That is, lexicographically, ﬁrst apply the loss function b([r,s]), and among those forecasts have equal b-value, then apply the
bð½r; sÞ loss function. By the preceding two lemmas, under the two decision rules named in Proposition 6, only the interval
[p,q] is bLU-optimal for forecasting event E when the forecaster’s uncertainty for that event is the IP-interval [p,q].
Aside: It is evident that the order of the components is irrelevant in this 2-tiered, lexicographic IP-Brier score.
To elicit an IP-forecast set F ¼ ffpi; qig : i ¼ 1; . . . ;ng for the events {E1,E2, . . . ,En} use, e.g., the 2n tiered lexicographic IP-
Brier scorehb1ð½r1; s1Þ; b1ð½r1; s1Þ; . . . ;bnð½rn; snÞ; bnð½rn; snÞi:Then the following is immediate from Proposition 6.
Corollary 1. The 2n-tiered, lexicographic IP-Brier score is strictly proper under either the C-Maximin or E-admissibility-followed-
by-C-Maximin decision rules.
As above, the order of the 2n-terms in the lexicography is irrelevant.
In the light of Proposition 5, the theory of IP-coherence2 developed in Section 3 does not produce a strictly-proper IP-
scoring rule. In section 3 all IP-forecasts have real-valued scores. The strictly proper, lexicographic IP-scoring rules identiﬁed
in Proposition 6 do not satisfy that structural assumption of the theory in Section 3. Thus, the analyses of Sections 3 and 4 do
not yet provide a uniﬁed account of IP-coherence2 and IP-proper scoring rules. In the next Section, we discuss our ideas
about this challenge, which was pointed out to us by one of the Readers.5. Summary
When coherence1 of 2-sided previsions is not enough, and elicitation also matters, then Brier score offers an incentive
compatible scoring rule with an equivalent coherence criterion: coherence2 – avoid dominated forecasts. This is de Finetti’s
analysis, Proposition 1.
We extend Brier scoring to IP-coherence2 of interval-valued forecasts, analogous to the familiar use of 1-sided (lower and
upper) previsions for deﬁning IP-coherence1. Subject to an IP-scoring rule for forecasting events, the coherent forecaster gives
lower and upper probabilistic forecasts for a particular set of events that characterize elements of an IP-model classM – e.g.,
the e-contamination class is characterized by IP-forecasts for the atoms of the measure space – Proposition 4. Coherence2 of
the set of IP-forecasts requires that these lower and upper forecasts are not dominated by any more determinate IP model
within the model class M, subject to the same IP scoring rule.
However, a distinguishing feature between coherence1 and coherence2, namely that Brier score is incentive compatible
for elicitation of 2-sided (real-valued) forecasts for events, does not extend to 1-sided forecasts. That is, according to
Proposition 5, there is no strictly proper, continuous real-valued IP-scoring rule for events. However, by relaxing the condi-
tions on scoring rules to permit a lexicographic utility, subject to either of two IP-decision rules that we investigate, there do
exist strictly proper IP-scoring rules for eliciting closed, interval-valued probability forecasts.
There are numerous open questions relating to the preliminary work reported in this paper. We list four topics on which
we are currently at work.
(1) The central results reported here about IP-coherence2 (Section 3) and IP-incentive compatible scoring (Proposition 6 of
Section 4) are based on Brier scoring, which is the basis of de Finetti’s approach to coherence2. As we showed in [21],
each strictly proper scoring rule can serve in place of Brier score to provide a foundation for subjective probability
based on forecasting rather than on the prevision game. We conjecture that the positive results reported here about
IP-coherence2 can be duplicated using other strictly proper scoring rules in place of Brier score.
(2) As noted in Section 2, neither coherence1 nor coherence2 constrains, respectively, a called-off prevision for an event or
a called-off forecast for an event, given a null-event. However, lexicographic expected utility [14] is one approach
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previsions given a null-event. (See [2] for a review of some of the open issues.) Proposition 6 identiﬁes a class of lex-
icographic scoring rules that satisfy IP-propriety with respect to interval valued forecasts for events. But those lexico-
graphic scores do not conform to the structural assumption of the theory of IP-coherence2 developed in Section 3,
which uses only real-valued scores.
Can we use lexicographic scoring rules to provide a uniﬁed theory that provides both an IP-coherence2(including
called-off forecasts given a non-empty event) and an IP-incentive compatible scoring rule?
(3) A different challenge to elicitation, even when probability is determinate, is the problem posed by state-dependent
utilities. This arises in the choice of the numeraire that is to be used, either with outcomes of previsions for coherence1,
or in scoring forecasts for coherence2. (See [20] for discussion of the problem in the setting of coherence1.)
Does forecasting afford any advantage over betting in this context and is there a difference also with IP-elicitation?
(4) De Finetti’s theory of coherence is designed to accommodate all ﬁnitely additive probabilities. That is, countable addi-
tivity is not a requirement of coherence1 or coherence2. This is achieved by insisting that incoherence, i.e., a failure of
simple dominance, is achieved using only ﬁnitely many previsions or only ﬁnitely many forecasts at one time. In other
words, a coherent set of previsions or forecasts may be dominated when more than ﬁnitely many are combined at
once, even though they cannot be dominated when only ﬁnitely many are combined. It is interesting, we ﬁnd, that
even with determinate probabilities, coherence1 and coherence2 are not equivalent in this regard. There are settings
where countably many coherent2 forecasts may be combined and remain (simply) undominated by all rival forecasts,
though these same previsions may result in a sure-loss when countably many are combined into a single option [25].
In order to accommodate all ﬁnitely additive probabilities, when does IP-coherence2 depend upon the restriction that
violations of dominance matter only when ﬁnitely many forecasts are scored at the same time?
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Appendix A
The atomic lower–upper probability [ALUP] class. This IP-class consists of closed, convex sets of probabilities deﬁned by
lower and upper probabilities for atomic events. That is an ALUP model is the largest (closed) convex set of distributions that
satisfy such bounds, where the bounds are achieved by the lower and upper probability values given for the atoms of the
space. See [10] for discussion about this IP-class of models.
IP-coherence2, where rival forecasts are taken from the ALUP class, arises when the forecaster is called upon to give low-
er-and-upper forecasts for each atom, x, and for the complement to each atom, xc, in the space. That is, in order to duplicate
Proposition 4 for the ALUP class the forecaster is called upon to give 2n-many forecasts when X = {x1, . . . ,xn}. Example 7
illustrates this.
Example 7 (A continuation of Example 4). An illustration of ALUP-coherence2. We provide 3 forecast sets for the atoms, and
their complements in a space deﬁned byX = {x1,x2,x3}. That is, each forecast set includes IP-forecasts for 6 events. Forecast
sets F jðj ¼ 2;3;4Þ are given as 6 pairs: {pi,qi} for xi;xci i ¼ 1;2;3. Each of the corresponding 3 score sets is comprised by 3
points, corresponding to the 3 states in X. Each point in a score set has 6 coordinates, corresponding to the scores for
forecasts of ðx1;xc1;x2;xc2;x3;xc3Þ.F 2 ¼ x1 x
c
1 x2 xc2 x3 xc3
ff:25; :50g f:50; :75g f:25; :50g f:50; :75g f:25; :50g f:50; :75gg
S2 ¼
ð:50; :50; :25; :75; :25; :75Þ for x1
ð:25; :75; :50; :50; :25; :75Þ for x2
ð:25; :75; :25; :75; :50; :50Þ for x2
F 3 ¼ x1 x
c
1 x3 xc2 x3 xc3
ff:20; :45g f:55; :80g f:20; :45g f:55; :80g f:20; :45g f:55; :80gg
S3 ¼
ð:45; :55; :20; :80; :20; :80Þ for x1
ð:20; :80; :45; :55; :20; :80Þ for x2
ð:20; ;80; :20; :80:45; :55Þg for x3
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c
1 x2 xc2 x3 xc3
ff:10; :35g f:65; :90g f:10; :35g f:65; :90g f:10; :35g f:65; :90gg
S4 ¼
ð:35; :65; :10; :90; :10; :90Þ for x1
ð:10; :90:35; :65; :10; :90Þ for x2
ð:10; :90; :10; :90; :35; :65Þg for x3Forecast sets F 2 and F 3 are ALUP-coherent. There do not exist more precise forecast sets from the ALUP-model that dom-
inate either of these sets of forecasts. Their score sets lie in the probability simplex for these 6 events.
Forecast set F 4 is ALUP-incoherent. A de Finetti projection of S4 produces a more determinate rival ALUP forecast with
dominating IP Brier score. In fact, the projection produces a more informative e-contamination model that dominates. The
respective IP-Brier scores for F 4 and for F 2 are independent ofx: For F4 the score is a constant penalty of 0.885. For F 2 it is
a constant penalty of 0.750.Appendix B
Example 8. This construction provides a more complicated illustration of Proposition 4 where the ﬁxed point F  of the
process is a limit of the recursive procedure given in the proof of (4.2). Let X = {x1,x2,x3}. Forecast sets F j are of the form
{{pi,qi}: for events xi: i = 1,2,3}.F ¼ F 0 ¼ ff:25; :60g; f:20; :50g; f:10; :40gg
S ¼ S0 ¼ fð:60; :20; :10Þ; ð:25; :50; :10Þ; ð:25; :20; :40Þg(Step 1) Project score set S0 to form setT1 ¼ fð:63; :23; :13; Þ; ð:30; :55; :15Þ; ð:30; :25; :45Þg
Form the new forecast and score sets F 1;S1 based on the probabilities in set T1F 1 ¼ ff:30; :63gf:23; :55gf:13; :45gg
S1 ¼ fð:63:23:13Þð:30; :55; :13Þð:30; :23; :45Þg(Step 2) Project set S1 to form setT2 ¼ fð:63; :23; :13Þð:305; :55; :15Þð:305; :25; :45Þg
Form the new forecast and score sets F 2;S2 based on the probabilities in set T2F 2 ¼ ff:305; :633gf:233; :555gf:135; :455gg
S2 ¼ fð:63; :23; :13Þð:305; :55; :13Þð:305; :23; :45Þg(Step 3) Project S2 to form setT3 ¼ fð:63; :23; :13Þð:30740; :55740; :13740Þð:30740; :23740; :45740Þg
Form the new forecast and score sets F 3;S3 based on the probabilities in set T3F 3 ¼ ff:30740; :63gf:23; :55740gf:13; :45740gg
S3 ¼ fð:63; :23; :13Þð:30740; :55740; :13Þð:30740; :23; :45740Þg(Step 4) Project S4 to form setT4  fð:63; :23; :13Þð:308; :558; :134Þð:308; :234; :458Þg
Form the new forecast and score sets F 4;S4 based on the probabilities in set T4F 4 ¼ ff:308; :63gf:23; :558gf:13; :458gg
S4 ¼ fð:63; :23; :13Þð:308; :558; :13Þð:308; :23; :458ÞgIterate the process which converges to forecast setF  ¼ ff:3086; :63gf:23; :558gf:13; :458gg
and score setS ¼ fð:63; :23; :13Þð:3086; :558; :13Þ ð:3086; :23; :458Þg
T. Seidenfeld et al. / International Journal of Approximate Reasoning 53 (2012) 1248–1261 1261F  is an e-contamination model whose IP-Brier score dominates F ’s score. F  has greater informativeness (greater determi-
nacy) than forecast F as the hull HðSÞ is isomorphic to a proper subset of the hull HðSÞ.References
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